[Vol.111

BANISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
McICH-L

F.

ARMSTRONG

f

In the course of the South's current struggle with its race problem,
increasing efforts have been made to remove, not the problem, but the
race. "Freedom riders" are told by judges and warned by governors
to get out and stay out; "sit-ins" are advised that there are no seating
problems at lunch counters in New York City; Senators present plans
to finance a Negro exodus to Africa; and citizens councils provide free
bus transportation and pocket money for voluntary exile to
Hyanisport.
So far, the means used to effect this solution have generally been
limited to the application of pressures such as financial inducement,
simple persuasion, economic harassment, social and political coercion,
and, occasionally, a judicial prod. Indeed, it would seem clear that a
vast majority of the large number of Negroes abandoning the South1,457,000 of them did so between 1950 and 1960 '-are subjected only
to those pressures inherent in an environment they consider to be unfriendly and without promise.
However, as southern Negroes become more organized, begin to
generate identifiable aims, and produce local leaders to articulate them,
southern whites may realize that individual troublemakers can be
disposed of and crowded jails emptied by means of a simple, time
honored, though somewhat archaic method of legal compulsionbanishment for life. The idea would seem more appropriate to Romeo
and Juliet or Great Expectations than to the solution of problems in
a modem society. Most people today think of banishment, if at all,
only in relation to fiction, antiquity, or both. "The device of thrusting
out of the group those who have broken its code is very ancient and
constitutes the most fearful fate which primitive law could inflict. The
offender . . . was driven forth naked into the wild." 2 Genesis relates

that Adam and Eve were banished from Eden, and "it has indeed been
contended that the mark set on Cain was not so much a miraculous or
talismanic sign for the protection of his life, as a sign probably connected with one of the most ancient of all forms of judicial punishtA.B. 1954, Yale University; LL.B. 1960, Harvard University.
York Bar.
' N.Y. Times, April 29, 1962, § 4, p. 8, col. 6.
2 Pluclmett, Outlawry, 11 ENCYC. Soc. ScO. 505 (1933).
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ment [-banishment]." ' The ancient civilizations of Babylon,4
Greece,' and Rome 6 employed banishment, and England made extensive use of it for centuries. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the English lost interest in banishing citizens. "No power on
earth, except the authority of parliament, can send a subject of England, not even a criminal, out of the land against his will." '
At the time the Union was formed, banishment did not appeal to
the United States, which had so recently been used as a depository for
Europe's "refuse."
[T]he idea of such laws would have been repulsive to
men of that time [1789]. Banishments were a thing of the
remote past .

.

. Very likely the Constitution would have

failed of ratification if the members of the state conventions
had been told that the proposed national government would
be able to throw people out of this country.8
Banishment, however, did not go the way of the pillory and the
whipping post.' Although banishment of a citizen from the country
has in recent years been no more than a theoretical possibility, at the
state level banishment exists as a practical fact. Trial judges and magistrates still impose banishment, often without naming it as such."0
Overt sentences of banishment are common in the handling of vagrants." Governors make banishment a condition for pardon."2 Most
significant, perhaps, is the fact that more widespread use of the practice in this country may merely await the awakening of state legislatures
3 Fink, Crimes and Punishenwts Under Ancient Hindu Law, 1 L.

MAGAZINE

REv. (4th ser.) 321, 333 (1875).
4 HARPER, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI KING OF BABYLON 55 (1904)

&

(§ 154 of

the Code).
5 CHAFEF, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 205 (1956).
6 SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 268 (6th ed. 1960).
74 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 298 (7th ed. 1795).
8
CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 205-06. The practice was not entirely repugnant to the colonists, however, as is illustrated by the cases of Roger Williams and
Anne Hutchinson. See DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIERTY 135 (1954).
9 Although it has not been used in over a decade, at least one whipping post
remains-in Delaware. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3908 (1953). A recent sentence
under this statute is now under review by the Delaware Supreme Court. Phila.
Evening Bulletin, Feb. 6, 1963, p. 3, col. 5. See generally CALDWELL, RED HANNAH

(1947).
10 See People v. Blakeman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 596, 339 P.2d 202 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959); In re Newbern, 168 Cal. App. 2d 472, 335 P.2d 948 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
The American Civil Liberties Union has recently protested the banishment of a
number of juveniles from Wildwood, N.J. Civil Liberties, Feb. 1963, p. 3, col. 6.
"1 See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
603 (1956).
12E.g., In re Cammarata, 341 Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 677 (1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 953 (1955).
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in jurisdictions faced with immigration or racial problems, large welfare budgets, overpopulation, and the like."3

I. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE OF BANISHMENT
Banishment has been defined as "a punishment inflicted upon
criminals, by compelling them to quit a city, place, or country for a
. Synonymous with exilement
specified period of time, or for life..
one's
country." '1
of
loss
compulsory
and imports a
Banishment for life need not be and in fact almost never has been
imposed for crimes warranting life imprisonment. The person banished is usually guilty of a crime carrying a short prison sentence which
will be imposed if he ever returns to the prohibited area. Banishment
is not, therefore, primarily a penological device. It is most suitable as
a means of effecting some other purpose.
In some cases, a convict's rehabilitation may indeed be furthered

by sending him to a particular place where he is required to remain
under local supervision for a specified time. 5 This may be particularly
true where the place to which he is sent is his home. In such a case,
the banishment is to and not from a place; the purpose is rehabilitation
rather than concession to politics and governmental laziness; the
limitations on freedom are not permanent; and the condition is no
more onerous than the usual parole restrictions on travel outside the
supervisory control of the parole authorities.'" The convict is in
exactly the same position as if under ordinary parole, with the .single
exception that he is in a location more conducive to his rehabilitation
than the one where he happened to violate the law.' The administration of justice would be furthered by even more extensive use of this
The criticism leveled at banishment, therefore,
sort of arrangement.'
13 Banishment is also employed in East Germany, N.Y. Times, August 27, 1961,
p. 1, col. 6; Soviet Russia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1962, p. 9, col. 6; Yugoslavia, N.Y.
Times, May 10, 1962, p. 11, col. 2; and South Africa, LOwm sTEN, BRUTAL MANDATE
108 (1962) ; N.Y. Post, March 23, 1960, p. 2, col. 4. See generally SUTHERLAND &
CRESSEY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 268; 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
303 (5th ed. 1942); Navasky, Deportation as Punishment, 27 U. KAN. Cny L. REV.
213 (1959); 32 N.C.L. RLv. 221 (1954); Note, 5 UTAHi L REv. 365 (1957).
14 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 183 (4th ed. 1951).

The
'5 See Ex ptrte Ridley, 3 Okla. Crim. 350, 353, 106 Pac. 549, 550 (1910).
usual geographical restriction of a parole requires the parolee to remain within the
jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. McCray, 222 S.C. 391, 73 S.E.2d 1 (1952).
16A good example of intelligent conditions, reflecting these considerations, is
Ex parte Nabors, 33 N.M. 324, 267 Pac. 58 (1928).
17 Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIamE CONTROL 56-82 (1955),

has attempted to systemize

this sort of parole on a national scale. Each state agrees to accept parole responsibility for any offender whose residence in the state and potential employment there
can be proven. The parolee is treated like all other parolees in that state but is
subject to being recalled by the state in which he was sentenced. See 31 MINN. L.
REv. 699 (1947); 21 ALBANY L. REv. 327 (1957).
isCooperation under the compact is incomplete due mainly to excessively high
residence and employment requirements.
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does not apply when sound criminological justifications exist for geographical restrictions on freedom. Criticism becomes appropriate when
banishment is permanent and unsupervised. These elements will be
included in the definition of banishment used in this Article.
Does banishment as thus defined serve any useful purpose? A
system of penology will necessarily contain many elements that have
undesirable features, but which are retained because of the overall
benefit thought to be derived from them.
Rehabilitation and the consequent reduction of recidivism are
presumably the prime objectives of modern penology."9 These goals
are quite clearly frustrated, rather than furthered, by removing the individual to be rehabilitated from the control of the authorities who
should be helping him. Severance from a corrupting environment may
occasionally aid the reformation of a particular individual,2" but this
can be accomplished by careful administration of selective limitations
on freedom.
Actually, banishment does not further any of the other real or
supposed penological ends. Crime will not be deterred by an ostensibly
merciful sentence that is rarely invoked. The same considerations
make the practice useless as a sop to the public's retributive impulses.
Protection of the public from the individual offender is achieved only
in the most parochial sense by foisting that offender on another jurisdiction. Finally, mercy, as an objective in the administration of criminal law, is most appropriately subsumed by considerations of rehabilitation; even if it were not, there is good reason to maintain that
banishment as an alternative to imprisonment is not merciful at all,
but is, on the contrary, so unmerciful as to be unconstitutional.

II.

BANISHMENT IN THE COURTS

A. The Legal Rule
Lower courts, virtually without exception, have been denied the
right to impose banishment in connection with a criminal sentence.2 '
19 Glueck, Indeterminate Sentence and Parole in the Federal System: Some
Comments on a Proposal, 21 B.U.L. REv. 21, 23 (1941).
20 See Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 325, 33 S.W. 106 (1895) (dictum);
L. REv. 1057 (1930).
30 CoLum.
2
1 People v. Blakeman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 596, 339 P.2d 202 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ;
Ex parte Scarborough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946);
People v. Lopez, 81 Cal. App. 199, 253 Pac. 169 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Hancock v.
Rogers, 140 Ga. 688, 79 S.E. 558 (1913); Burnstein ex rel. Burnstein v. Jennings,
231 Iowa 1280, 4 N.W2d 428 (1942) ; People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95
(1930); Hoggett v. State, 101 Miss. 269, 57 So. 811 (1912); People v. Wallace,
124 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Suffolk County Ct. 1953); State v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 368, 74
S.E.2d 922 (1953); State v. Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E. 501 (1900); Ex parte
Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P.2d 438 (1935) (dictum).
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county,24

state,25

or

2

country are all proscribed, whether directly imposed, offered as an
alternative to authorized punishment, 4 or attached as a condition to
probation.29 Public policy reasons are given, most often focusing on
one factor-interstate comity.
To permit one State to dump its convict criminals into
another would entitle the State believing itself injured thereby
to exercise its policies and military power in the interest of its
own peace, safety, and welfare, to repel such an invasion.
It would tend to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and
disturb that fundamental equality of political rights among
the several States which is the basis of the Union itself.
Such a method of punishment is not authorized by statute,
and is impliedly prohibited by public policy."
Although the courts have made other arguments against banishment,3 1 they generally limit their policy considerations to a quotation
from the above passage or one like it. Nevertheless, underlying all of
the decisions, is a strong feeling that, aside from the inter-jurisdictional
strife it causes, banishment is inappropriate and undesirable as a
punishment.
The closing words of the above quotation, however, contain a disturbing reservation that is found in most of the decisions. Courts
apparently consider themselves barred from imposing a sentence of
banishment only in the absence of affirmative legislative authority to
do so. If public policy is the only available rationale for an attack on
a sentence of banishment, a legislative authorization of banishment,
specifically drafted in terms of public policy, would seem to foreclose
judicial consideration of the matter. In an early Supreme Court
opinion, Mr. Justice Cushing said, "The right to .

.

. banish, in

the case of an offending citizen, must belong to every government.
22

People v. Smith, 252 Mich. 4, 232 N.W. 397 (1930).

23 Ex parte Scarborough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (Dist. Ct. App.

1946).24

Hancock v. Rogers, 140 Ga. 688, 79 S.E. 558 (1913); Hoggett v. State, 101
Miss.2 5269, 57 So. 811 (1912).
26

27

People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930).
People v. Lopez, 81 Cal. App. 199, 253 Pac. 169 (Dist Ct. App. 1927).

State v. Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E. 501 (1900).

28 People v. Wallace, 124 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Suffolk County Ct. 1953).

29 People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930).
so Id. at 189, 231 N.W. at 96.
31 Chief among these arguments is lack of statutory authority. Cf. Millsaps v.
Strauss, 208 Ark. 265, 185 S.W.2d 933 (1945). Other arguments advanced are the
inability of a court to suspend sentence indefinitely in the absence of a statute, Shondell v. Bradley, 42 Ohio App. 8, 181 N.E. 559 (1931), and the illegality of alternative
sentences, State v. Hatley, 110 N.C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892) (dictum).
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[I] t naturally, as well as tacitly, belongs to the legislature." 32 However, because legislation authorizing banishment as a sentence has
never been passed,3" an assertion of legislative authority has not actually been tested. But modem banishment cases often contain dictum
indicating that such legislation would survive judicial attack. 4
B. Actual Court Practice
Even in the absence of enabling legislation, and despite the contrary judicial authority, some lower courts do impose banishment as
a sentence. 5 A California trial judge imposed the following sentence
upon a vagrant charged with public drunkenness:
"This document I have just signed is an order directing the
Chief of Police to commit you to jail for a period of 180 days.
However, there will be a five-day stay of execution in this
matter, which means that you will be released now to get
out of this state. This court warns you, however, that you
had better get out of this state and stay out. You will be a
fugitive from Justice, and while we will not extradite you
from any other state on this, if you ever again set foot in the
state of California, you are going to spend 180 days in jail
just as surely as your name is Emery Newbern." 36
The appellate court, although holding the conviction void on another
ground, said that notwithstanding the policy against banishment, this
sentence was technically unimpeachable on that ground; the lower
court had not imposed banishment, but had merely afforded the op87
portunity for an illegal departure.
The California trial court's ingenuity is unusual but its approach
to the problem of vagrancy is not. "[I]n spite of the revulsion which
liberty-loving people have long had against banishment, it lingers on
in many magistrate courts. ..
Scores of people are .thus banished
from our cities every day." 3 Lower courts, faced with pressing local
problems, little public scrutiny, and the unlikelihood of appeal, have
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 14, 18 (1800).
33 Cooper v. Telfair, supra note 32, involved a statute authorizing banishment
in that it was a bill of attainder specifically banishing the defendant by name. The
Court at this early date doubted its own power to invalidate such a statute as unconstitutional. Id. at 19 (Chase, J.). See Note, 5 UTAH L. REv. 365, 367 (1957).
34 See, e.g., Ex parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P.2d 438 (1935).
35 See, for example, the procedure employed in State v. McAfee, 189 N.C. 320,
127 S.E. 204 (1925) ; In re Hinson, 156 N.C. 250, 72 S.E. 310 (1911) ; State v. Hatley,
110 N.C.
522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892).
36 In re Newbern, 168 Cal. App. 2d 472, 475, 335 P.2d 948, 950 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
37 Id. at 476, 335 P.2d at 951.
38 Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1960).
For
recent incidents involving juvenile offenders, see Civil Liberties, Feb. 1963, p. 3, col. 3.
32
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regularly seen fit simply to ignore appellate rulings on the subject. A
standard modus operandi has been developed which relies heavily on
a type of banishment.
We are advised by counsel for respondent that in sentencing
the prisoner in the manner above related, the trial judge was
but following an established routine or custom. If that be
true the custom is not founded in law but is based solely upon
someone's arbitrary view as to how offenders against an
ordinance such as the one involved here should be punished."9
The local patrolman will, and indeed must, always be able to
effect an on the spot "banishment" by simply ordering an undesirable
to "move on." When, however, matters reach the magistrate's courtroom, two new elements are added-the offender must leave the entire
jurisdiction, and a prison sentence is held over his head to discourage
his return.
It has been said that since vagrants are arrested for being something rather than for doing something, and are charged with a condition rather than a crime, the vagrancy laws should be thought of as
preventive rather then punitive."0 This view, however, has been
vigorously denounced as "an echo from an ancient position that has
almost entirely disappeared at the present time." '
It would indeed
seem unthinkable to allow such a distinction to exempt vagrancy procedures from basic criminal safeguards when under such procedures
a man can receive up to two years in prison.
There are practically no regular procedures in "mass production"
vagrancy trials. They seem to represent the worst sort of amalgam of
police informality and judicial authority, and sentences of banishment are handed down in the same informal manner that characterizes
the entire proceedings. A tramp, saved from a prison term only by
producing a bus ticket, is told: "'You better get on that bus quick...
because if you're picked up between here and the station, you're a dead
duck.' " " The tramp sprints for the bus station, and the community
is freed from the problem created by his presence. In this way, large
numbers of such undesirables are ejected rather than dealt with by
n In re Newbern, 168 Cal. App. 2d 472, 476, 335 P.2d 948, 951 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
40 See People v. Belcasto, 356 Ill. 144, 148, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934); Lacey,
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L Rnv. 1203 (1953).
41 Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237, 251 (1958).
42
Vagrancy proceedings are examined at length in Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law
and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 603 (1956). The article was based upon
stenographic notes taken by the author's agents who observed hundreds of vagrancy
"trials." Official transcripts are almost never taken in such proceedings. See Douglas,
supra note 38.
43
Foote, supra note 42, at 605.
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the community. Other communities handle the problem similarly, and
a large mass of transient "floaters" is created by an illegal banishment
procedure that solves the problems of no one except the politicians and
crusading newspapers who find it profitable to raise a periodic furor
about "clearing the bums off the streets."
Considering the tremendous problems involved in dealing with
vagrants, some slipshod administration is unavoidable. The volume
of cases is fantastic; 44 public prejudice is often very high; and magistrates usually lack adequate probation facilities and the power to
utilize those that exist. Even appellate courts are inclined to find
procedural niceties less compelling than the oft quoted view of one
judge: "Society recognizes that vagrancy is a parasitic disease which,
if allowed to spread, will sap the life of that upon which it feeds." "
Perhaps the judge was accurate in describing the vagrancy problem in terms of disease rather than crime 6 But this does not justify
resort to an illegal remedy. If the alternative of banishment can be
eliminated, communities that are no longer able to duck the problem
47
of vagrancy may be moved to deal with it.

III.

BANISHMENT AND THE PARDON POWER

Judicial declarations invalidating banishment by courts do not
purport to apply to executive pardon. The modern pardon power has
been held to be analogous to that of the Kings of England and, therefore, almost absolute.4
Public policy places no limitations on the
executive, who is usually not even required to state the reasons for
his actions much less to justify them.49 Consequently, although banishment is uniformly condemned when connected with a judicial sentence,
it is upheld with equal unanimity when attached as a condition to
executive pardon.5 0
44 It is not uncommon for a magistrate to deal with fifty or sixty defendants in
less than a quarter of an hour. One magistrate was found to handle 1,600 cases a
month. Id. at 605-07.
45 State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 233, 24 P.2d 601, 603 (1933).
46
Historically, the problem has not usually been considered a criminal one. See
Foote, supra note 42, at 615, 616; Geeson, The Justices, the Vagrants and the Poor,
112 JUSTI E OF THE PEACE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REV. 289 (1948).
47
Removal statutes, whereby a state rids itself of out-of-staters who are on the
relief rolls, have been held constitutional. In the Matter of Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417,
28 N.E.2d 895 (1940). They have been considered non-penal attempts to place the
expense of supporting an indigent on his home state.
4
SVanilla v. Moran, 188 Misc. 325, 333, 67 N.Y.S.2d 833, 841 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
272 App. Div. 859, 70 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1947), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 796, 83 N.E.2d 696 (1949).
49 "Often the reasons for pardons have been absurd and ridiculous. One governor
remitted a death sentence because 'hanging would do the man no good . . ..
Stoke, A Review of the Pardon Power, 16 Ky. L.J. 34, 36 (1927).
5
0 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800) ; Kavalin v. White, 44 F.2d 49
(10th Cir. 1930) ; Ex Parte Hawkins, 61 Ark. 321, 33 S.W. 106 (1895) ; Ex Parte
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The right to attach conditions to a pardon is occasionally based on
the language in a constitutional grant, 51 but a simple grant of power to
pardon is adequate and more common.5 2 A condition may be precedent, in which case suspension of the sentence does not take place until
compliance; or subsequent, whereby the suspension is revoked if the
condition is violated.53 Various types of conditions may be imposedgood behavior,5" a duty to report, a requirement of enlistment, 55 a
curfew, sobriety, or banishment. Finally, a condition can remain in
effect beyond the expiration of the original sentence, so that a man may
be subject to it for the rest of his life." If the condition is violated,
the sentence may be automatically reimposed, without a hearing.s
A. The Illegal, Immoral, or Impossible Condition
There is one limitation on the pardon power, but it is seldom
invoked. A condition must not be "illegal, immoral or impossible of
performance." " A condition is not illegal, however, unless expressly
prohibited by law. 9 Conditions have actually been upheld where
statutory or constitutional requirements were ignored or contraMarks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109 (1883); Pippin v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 450, 15 S.E2d
712 (1941); State ex rel. O'Connor v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N.W. 1065 (1893);
Ex parte Strauss, 320 Mo. 349, 7 S.W.2d 1000 (1928); cf. In re Cammarata, 341
Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 677 (1954) ; People v. Potter, 1 Parker, Cr. R. 47, 1 Edm.
Sel. Cas. 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); Ex parte Lockhart, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 515
(Super. Ct 1855) ; Ex parte Snyder, 81 Okla. Crim. 34, 159 P.2d 752 (1945) ; Ex
parte Sherman, 81 Okla. Crim. 41, 159 P.2d 755 (1945) ; Commonwealth v. Haggerty,
4 Brewster 326 (Phila., Pa. County Ct. 1869); Flavell's Case, 8 W. & S. 197 (Pa.
1844); State v. Barnes, 32 S.C. 14, 10 S.E. 611 (1890); State v. Fuller, 1 McCord
178 (S.C. 1821) ; State v. Smith, 1 Bailey 283 (S.C. 1829).
51
See Ex parte Lockhart, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 515 (Super. Ct 1855).
52
See U.S. CoxsT. art. II, § 2; Vitale v. Hunter, 206 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1953).
5
3This distinction is basic in the rare case where a court holds a pardon condition to be void. If the condition was "subsequent," the pardon becomes 'absolute.
Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 148, 51 S.W. 1106 (1899). See 12 MINx. L. REv.
291-93 (1928). However, in People v. Blakeman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 596, 339 P2d
202 (Dist. Ct App. 1959), the court did not bother with such distinctions and simply
held that a condition of banishment was separable from the pardon to which it is
attached. The individual was entitled to his freedom when the condition was voided.
54 State ex rel. Brown v. Mayo, 126 Fla. 811, 171 So. 822 (1937).
M Huff v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 12, 14 S.E2d 456 (1941)
(enlist in CCC); Ex
parte Brown, 243 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951) (enlist in Army).
56 Harrell v. Mount, 193 Ga. 818, 20 S.E.2d 69 (1942).
57
uckle v. Clarke, 191 Ga. 202, 12 S.E.2d 339 (1940); Ex parte Snyder, 81
Okla. Crim. 34, 159 P.2d 752 (1945) ; Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935)
(dictum). But see Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941); Weihofen,
Revoking Probation,Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing, 32 J. CRM. L. & CRImINoLoyY 531 (1942); Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 309 (1951); 28 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 158
(1955). This may be true even if the punishment is death and the death penalty is
abolished prior to the breach of the pardon condition. State v. Addington, 2 Bailey
516 (S.C. 1831).
58In re McKinney, 33 Del. 434, 436, 138 Adt. 649, 650 (1927).
59 State v. Barnes, 32 S.C. 14, 10 S.E. 611 (1890).
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vened.
The requirement that a condition not be immoral seems to be
used only as a makeweight. Even the impossibility of a condition has
not always proved fatal."
Some courts have stated a broader rule. "[The condition must
be] consistent with justice, and neither opposed to public policy [n] or
the law of the land." 62 However, statements of limitation of any sort
are invariably made in opinions upholding a condition; few cases can
be found in which a condition actually was invalidated.6
Courts have almost always found a condition of banishment to
be legal, moral, and possible of performance, even in cases where the
state constitution contained a provision outlawing banishment specifically. 4 The only case squarely holding a condition of banishment
void 65 was subsequently disapproved. 6 It has even been held that a
state has power to banish from the country. In an early New York
case, a man serving five years for grand larceny was pardoned on such
a condition. When he was subsequently discovered in Louisiana, it
was held that his presence there revoked his pardon.6
Once in a great while, a court may modify the rigors of a particular banishment order under the press of appealing circumstances.6 s
The usual attitude, however, has been one of extreme rigidity,
exemplified by the case of a woman who returned to a state from which
she had been banished because she needed medical attention in order
to save her life. She was discovered, her sentence was reimposed, and
she was returned to prison. 9
6oEx parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855) ; Baston v. Robbins, 153 Me.
128, 135 A.2d 279 (1957).
61 State v. Fuller, 1 McCord 178 (S.C. 1821).
62 Ex parte Lockhart, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 515, 516 (Super. Ct. 1855).
63
But see Logan v. People, 138 Colo. 304, 332 P.2d 897 (1958) (furnish appearance bond) ; In re McKinney, 33 Del. 434, 138 Atl. 649 (1927) (pardon revocable
by probation official) ; State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 100 N.W. 510
(1904) (forfeit good-time allowance) ; Commonwealth v. Fowler, 8 Va. (4 Call) 35
(1785) (work three years as public official directs).
64 Ex parte Snyder, 81 Okla. Crim. 34, 159 P.2d 752 (1945).

65 Commonwealth v. Hatsfield, 2 Pa. L.J. Rep. 32 (Berks County Oyer &
Terminer 1842).
66
Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 4 Brewster 326 (Phila., Pa. County Ct. 1869).
In this case, Commonwealth v. Fowler, 8 Va. (4 Call) 35 (1785) and Ex parte
Amour Hunt, 10 Ark. (5 English) 284 (1850), upon which the Hatsficld opinion
had relied, were both successfully distinguished.
67 People v. Potter, 1 Parker, Cr. R. 47, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1846) ; accord, It re Cammarata, 341 Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 677 (1954).
68 People v. James, 2 Cai. R. 57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (offender granted an
additional forty days to leave the country upon showing that insanity had prevented
his timely departure).
69 Pippin v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 450, 15 S.E.2d 712 (1941).
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B. The HistoricalArgument for Banishment by Pardon
Opinions upholding banishment by pardon usually are prefaced by
some reference to the historical background of the pardon power, particularly as practiced in England.
As this power had been exercised, from time immemorial,
by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bears a close
resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for
the rules prescribing the manner in which it is. to be

used

....

70

Under common law, pardon was a peculiarly royal prerogative
which had to be granted under the Great Seal.7" The King's pardon
power was extremely broad, and his right to impose conditions was
unquestioned.7 2 That power still represented a kingly manifestation
of mercy when transplanted to the colonies to be exercised by the
royal governors. After the Revolution, fear of a strong executive
caused many states to vest the pardon power in the legislature. 3 The
later move back to the executive was followed by a further shift of
power to parole boards.7 4 All of this would seem to indicate the importance of indigenous factors rather than the relevance of the English
experience. It would seem more appropriate to relate banishment to
modern values than to historical ones which to a large extent have
been discredited. An appeal to history can never be more than an
introduction intended to lend weight to a position that has supposedly
survived through history for other reasons.
C. Banishment as a Merciful Act of Grace
Although the notion would seem more appropriate in a monarchistic society than in ours, American judges still maintain, as did Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall in 1833, that the granting of a pardon is a
merciful "act of grace" to which a sovereign may attach any condition
70 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149, 159-60 (1833).
7
1See Brett, Conditional Pardons and the Commutation of Death Sentences, 20
MODERN L. REv. 131, 132 (1957).
72
For a more complete history of the pardon power see JENSEN, PARDONING
POWER IN THE Am.RmCAN STATES 1-8 (1922); Brett, .upra note 71; Lattin, The
Pardoning Power in Massachusetts, 11 B.U.L. REv. 505 (1931); Weihofen, Consolidation of Pardon and Parole: A Wrong Approach, 30 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
534 (1939).
73
See JENSEN, op. cit. supra note 72, at 9; SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES
OF CamnqoLoGy 545 (6th ed. 1960).

74 See id. at 269; 13 VA. L. REV. 245 (1927).
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it chooses.7 "Nor is there any substance in the contention that there
is any substantial difference in this matter between the executive power
of pardon in our Government and the King's prerogative." "
Mercy and acts of grace should have no place at all in a system
that dispenses adequate justice initially and which maintains appropriate machinery for the handling and release of convicts in accordance
with modern penological standards. In the hands of an overworked
executive, the pardon power is too often subject to political, emotional,
and other irrelevant influences. A New York governor claimed that a
77
second chief executive was needed to handle nothing but pardons.
Beccaria wrote:
Happy the nations in which [pardons] . . . will be considered as dangerous! Clemency, which has often been
deemed a sufficient substitute for every other virtue in
sovereigns, should be excluded in a perfect legislation, where
punishments are mild, and the proceedings in criminal cases
regular and expeditious.7"
Montesquieu, Kant, Bentham, and others concurred in this opinion.7"
The fact is that the machinery of justice is not yet so perfect that
mercy cannot occasionally serve as an important cog.80 However, that
cog must mesh with the system of which it is a part.
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an
individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the
Constitutional scheme. When granted, it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be
better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed. 1
As a "part of the constitutional scheme" the pardon would seem subject to constitutional limitations, particularly with respect to'a function
like the annexing of conditions, where the elements of "mercy" and
"grace" are really not relevant at all. The pardon itself might be con75 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149, 160 (1833).
78
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 113 (1925).
77 SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, op. cit. supra note 73, at 546.
78
BEccARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 134 (1807).
t9 JENSEN, op. cit. supra note 72, at 23-29; Weihofen, Pardon: An Extraordinary
Remedy, 12 RocxY MT.L. REV. 112, 113 (1940) ; cf. GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JusTIcE 109-11 (1933).
80 Restrictions on parole make the need for mercy particularly real as in juris-

dictions where parole is unavailable in life sentences. Note, A Survey of the Law
of Probation and Parole in Pennsylvania, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 309 (1957). See also
Weihofen, supra note 72, at 537.
81 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) ; accord, 3 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 195 (1939); Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole
or PardonWithout a Hearing, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 534 (1942) ; Note,
65 HARv. L. REv. 309 (1951); Comment, 28 So. CAL. L. REV. 158 (1955).
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sidered to be an act of mercy but a condition annexed thereto is most
assuredly not. Complete mercy would result in complete pardon, and
if a condition is imposed to limit that pardon its merciful qualities must
spring from something other than the mercy it serves to diminish.
D. Judicial Review of Banishment by Pardon: A Problem
of Separation of Powers
Another fallacy which shields banishment by pardon from proper
scrutiny is the notion that the doctrine of separation of powers bars any
sort of judicial review.
Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of
the criminal law . . . . [I]t has always been thought
essential in popular governments, as well as in monarchies,
to vest in some other authority than the courts power to
ameliorate or avoid particular criminal judgments."2
According to this theory, the executive is given an absolute check on
injustices in the other -two branches of government. To preserve the
effectiveness of that check, the courts must be denied the power to
review the executive's action. The only remedy for abuse is through
the improbable, and to the convict, the highly irrelevant counter-check
of impeachment. " 'Even for the grossest abuse of this discretionary
power vested in the Governor the law affords no remedy. The courts
have no concern with the reasons which actuate the Executive. The
discretion exercised by him . . . is beyond the control or legitimate

criticism of the judiciary.' "
Conditional pardons, therefore, are
upheld on the specific ground that the greater power of complete pardon
necessarily includes the lesser power of conditional pardon. A court's
power to review both is equally limited."'
A condition, however, is not really a part of the pardon to which
it is attached; rather, it detracts from the merciful quality which immunizes the pardon from review. The validity of the power to place
limitations on a pardon should depend upon factors relevant to that
power, and not upon the totally unrelated purposes behind the pardon
itself. If a condition is oppressive, particularly if speciously attractive
when imposed, the purpose of protecting the convict from harsh application of the law is subverted by a court's refusal to interfere. In such
82Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925).
83Ex parte Snyder, 81 Okla. Crim. 34, 38, 159 P.2d 752, 754 (1945), quoting
Ex parte Edwards, 78 Okla. Crim. 213, 219, 146 P2d 311, 314 (1944); see 11 CoRNELL L.Q. 528, 529 (1926).
84Ex parte Lockhart, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 515, 516 (Super. Ct 1855).

19631

BANISHMENT

a case, harshness emanates from the very executive whose immunity
from review is supposed to check harshness, and the assumption that a
pardon is always merciful and never, in any way, detrimental to the
convict is no longer true. The fact that an act of executive "clemency"
is involved should not alter the importance of insuring that "those
who inflict a deprivation of liberty are not the final arbiters of its
legality." 85
E. The Contract Theory
The most common justification for banishment by pardon is based
on the undeniable fact that, unlike Romeo, the convict often embraces
his fate quite eagerly. Caveat emptor as applied to hardened criminals
seems only too appropriate, and the guarantees and legal rules that
would normally attach to this peculiarly criminal area are put aside
because somehow the issue has become contractual. So forceful is the
effect of this transmutation that it is the favorite means whereby courts
evade specific constitutional bans on banishment; they are interpreted
as being inapplicable in a voluntary, contractual setting-"0 As one
court expressed it, "[T]here is necessarily comprehended within the
word, ['grant' of pardon] the idea that the minds of both parties to the
instrument have met, that they have agreed that one shall execute and
deliver, and the other shall accept and receive." 87
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated that "A pardon is a deed, to
the validity of which, delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete,
without acceptance." ' In dictum in the same case, the Chief Justice
went on to postulate what appeared to be a key assumption in the
analogy. "It [the pardon] may then be rejected by the person to whom
it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a
court to force it on him." " However, when a case finally arose where
a convict actually insisted on his right to refuse a pardon, Mr. Justice
Holmes said: "Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether
he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what
shall be done." o Thus, the contract may be imposed upon the convict
85 Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (concurring opinion).

soEx parte Lockhart, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 515, 516 (Super. Ct. 1855).
87 People v. Potter, 1 Parker, Cr. R. 47, 51, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235, 240 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct 1846).
88United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 149, 160 (1833).
89 Ibid.
9o Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). In this case a death penalty
was commuted to life imprisonment. For procedural reasons the convict sought to
maintain that his lack of consent voided the pardon. Similar results were reached
in a parole context in Gould v. Taylor, 153 F. Supp. 71 (M.D. Pa. 1957), and in
Singleton v. Looney, 218 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1955). Contra, In re Peterson, 14
Cal. 2d 82, 92 P.2d 890 (1939), where a convict was allowed to refuse parole to
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against his will and, if argumeits involving the executive act of grace
and the separation of powers are accepted in their entirety, there is no
legal compulsion at all for the executive to keep his side of the already
one-sided bargain. There is, of course, no real bargaining between a
convict and his sovereign-the terms are not arrived at bilaterally, the
parties are in no sense equal, and there is agreement only in the sense
that the convict finds the situation temporarily agreeable. Even if the
form of the transaction is conceded to be of some significance, what we
have here is a strange sort of contract from which to draw rigorous
analogies. 1
In truth, the form is entirely irrelevant. The grant by the
executive is itself the event that gives life to the pardon. Acceptance
by the convict only aids in determining whether or not the grant will
be made.92 To suppose that a matter involving both the public welfare
and the life and freedom of an individual should be decided by reference to the laws of the market place would be preposterous were it
not for the illustrious authority that can be cited for the proposition.9"
If the convict has rights with respect to the conditions of his pardon,
they are not the result of a contract with the executive, but of the laws
and constitutional provisions pertinent to the administration of criminal justice. "Indeed, it is only in a somewhat fictitious sense that a
conditional pardon is spoken of as a contract. It is, as a matter of
fact, simply the grant and acceptance of a privilege, with a condition
attached, in accordance with which the privilege may be revoked." 94
The peculiar dichotomy arrived at by the courts with respect to
banishment by sentence and banishment by pardon highlights the
absurdity of the contract theory. Can a governor's conditional pardon
be justified as being contractual when a judge cannot make the same
contract with a probationer? 9
another state where he was wanted for a more serious crime. Commentators generally agree with the holding in Biddle. See 3 ATTORNEY GENERA'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 180 (1939); 41 Ops. Ar 'y Gm., No. 37 (1955); Weihofen,
supra note 81. Contra, Brett, supra note 72.
9Other contractual concepts that have been applied in pardon situations ar~e
estoppel, In re Cammarata, 341 Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 677 (1954), and fraud, Ex
parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109 (1883).
92 Some jurisdictions label a condition without consent a "commutation" and
require specific statutory authority for its exercise. Ex parte Lefors, 165 Tex Crim. 51,
303 S.W2d 394 (1957). In a few jurisdictions, consent is statutorily required. E.g.,
OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2965.10 (Page 1954) (must accept pardon); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 250 (1961) (must accept any condition imposed).
93 Marshall's dictum in Wilson has been vigorously attacked on its own terms.
"No such rule is laid down by the English authorities. On the contrary . . . the
convict was not permitted to waive [a pardon]." 3 ATTORNEY GENERA'S SURVEY
0

RELEASE PROCEDURES 180 (1939).

94State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 574, 100 N.W. 510, 512 (1904).
9 A distinction can conceivably be made if probation is thought of as in no way
constituting punishment. 11 B.U.L. Rv. 278 (1931). The situation with respect
to parole is illustrated by Gould v. Taylor, 153 F. Supp. 71 (M.D. Pa. 1957) ; Singleton v. Looney, 218 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1955).
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Rejecting the contention that the defendant had waived the right
to challenge his banishment because he had suggested it in the first
place and benefited by the resulting probation, a California court said:
The fallacy of this argument is that we are not dealing with
a right or privilege conferred by law upon the litigant for his
sole personal benefit. We are concerned with a principle of
fundamental public policy. The law cannot suffer the state's
interest and concern in the observance and enforcement of
this policy to be thwarted through the guise of waiver of a
personal right by an individual."'
The irrelevance of the law of contracts to the conditions imposed
on a pardon is particularly manifest when a condition is attacked on
grounds of cruelty. It would seem quite clear that a sadistic governor
cannot exchange twenty years of freedom for a pound of flesh, regardless of the wishes of the convict in question.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF ATTACK

The most effective way to remove the practice and threat of
banishment would be to find a constitutional basis on which it might be
attacked. Sentencing judges would find it difficult to evade or ignore
a clear holding of unconstitutionality. Legislatures could not contradict it, and executive imposition of banishment by pardon, if not illegal
under the traditional pardon limitations, would be invalidated as being
unconstitutional.
A. The Right To Travel
One constitutional right that has been mentioned in most comments on banishment and elaborated on at length in some ". is the right
to travel. If the Constitution grants a citizen of the United States the
unqualified right to travel freely, limiting that freedom would seem
unconstitutional.
Relying on an 1868 Supreme Court decision,9" Mr. Justice
Douglas, in a concurring opinion in Edwards v. California,9 disagreed
with the majority holding that a California anti-migrant statute
violated only the commerce clause of the Constitution:
I am of the opinion that the right of persons to move freely
from State to State occupies a more protected position in
Ws People v. Blakeman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 596, 598, 339 P2d 202, 203 (1959).
07 See Bowman, The United States Citizen's Privilege of State Residence, 10
B.U.L. Rsv. 459 (1930); 11 B.U.L. REv. 278, 279 (1931); Note, 5 UTAH L. Rnv.
365, 374 (1957).
98 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
99 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (concurring opinion).
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our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle,
fruit, steel and coal across state lines. . . .
The right to
move freely from State to State is an incident of national
citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference. 0
This argument, however, may go too far. Of chief concern is
the possible effect of such a doctrine on useful restrictions analogous
to parole. For instance, the administration of the Interstate Compact '' might be affected. Any program limiting the right to travel
would seem to be jeopardized regardless of penological considerations.
If an attempt were made to protect the parole system on the ground
that the right to travel is no more applicable to a parolee than to an
imprisoned convict, the same reasoning could be applied to a banished
convict. Problems of this sort arise because the factors that differentiate objectionable banishment from worthwhile penological devices
are not translatable in terms of a right to travel.
B. Due Process
Professor Chafee had considerable difficulty with Justice Douglas'
position. With respect to anti-migrant legislation, he preferred reliance on the due process clause.
Already in several decisions the Court has used the Due
Process Clause to safeguard the right of the members of any
race to reside wheie they please inside a state, regardless of
ordinances and injunctions. Why is not this clause equally
available to assure the right to live in any state one desires?
Thus the "liberty" of all human beings which cannot
be taken away without due process of law includes .
liberty of movement.'
This approach is a variant of the right-to-travel argument.
Whether or not it solves the problem of anti-migrant- laws, it is not
useful in dealing with banishment, a strictly penological problem.
What is needed is a constitutional doctrine that addresses itself to
penological factors.
V. BANISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is a constitutional provision framed directly in terms of penological considera100 Ibid. See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ; Note, The Right
To Travel, 6 NATURAL L.F. 109 (1961).
101 Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers, HANDBOO1 10ON INTERSTATE CRimE CONTROL 56-82 (1955) ; See note 17 supra.
2 CHAFEF THREE HUMAx RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 192-93
(1956).
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tions. This provision is applicable to the states, 10 3 most of which have
an analogous prohibition in their own constitutions. 0 4 If it can be
shown that the eighth amendment proscribes banishment, it may serve
not only to strengthen the fourteenth amendment due process argument
by grounding it upon a more relevant right, but also may render
banishment vulnerable to state constitutional objections. 5 The difficulties encountered in relying on a right to travel are avoided because
all considerations relevant to a right specifically concerned with punishment are necessarily within a penological framework. Those forms
of expulsion that meet valid penological criteria would not be cruel
and, therefore, not proscribed.
The historic roots of the ban against cruel and unusual punishment can be traced back to 1042 during the reign of Edward the
Confessor.'0 The ban was reformulated in the Magna Charta,107 and,
after the atrocities of the Tudor and Stuart periods, was embodied in
the Declaration of Rights of 1688.0 The prohibition was transposed
almost directly from that Declaration to the United States Constitution. 0 9 Similar provisions can be found in colonial laws as early as
1641 and are now in effect in most of the states."
A. The HistoricalInterpretation

Judicial discussions of a cruel and unusual punishment clause
almost always begin with an apologetic statement that the concept has
never been adequately defined."' Some courts then try to define it in
meaningful, modem terms, but many merely enumerate a few of the
horrors--drawing and quartering, dragging, crucifixion, disembowel-2
ling-to which that ban was directed in the seventeenth century."1
They are satisfied to point out that no such behavior exists today.
103 Although there has been some confusion as to whether or not the cruel and
unusual punishment ban is incorporated in the fourteenth amendment, recent Supreme
Court decisions seem to settle the fact that it is. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) ; see
Sutherland, Due Process atd Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 271 (1950).
104 Of the first forty-eight states, only Vermont and Connecticut do not have
explicit provisions. Decisions indicate that the ban is assumed to exist by implication
in those jurisdictions. 34 MINN. L. REv. 134, 136 (1950). The constitutions of
Alaska (art. I § 12) and Hawaii (art. I § 9) contain explicit provisions.
105 In a few states, however, it is not clear that the cruel and unusual punishment ban is binding upon the legislature. See Kirschgessner v. State, 174 Md. 195,
198 At. 271 (1938).
106 Note, 4 VAND. L. Rxv. 680, 682 (1951).
107 Magna Charta, cl. 20.
1081 W. & M. 2, c. 2.
109 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES oN THE CoNsrnUnioN § 1903 (4th ed. 1873).
110 See note 104 supra.
"'1E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
112 E.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
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Story flatly stated that "the provision would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any
department of such a government should authorize or justify such
atrocious conduct." "
Most courts that espouse the historical approach do not follow
their premise to such an ultimate conclusion. They merely state that
the prohibition applies only to "such .

.

. cruel and unusual punish-

ments as disgraced the civilization of former ages, and made one
shudder with horror to read of them." 114 They then go on to conclude
that the particular punishment under review is clearly not of that type.
As a practical matter," 5 this treatment of the cruel and unusual punishment doctrine virtually removes the prohibition.
B. Judicial Reaction to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Approach to Banishment
In the leading case of Weems v. United States,"" the Supreme
Court took a more flexible view of the eighth amendment. Questioning the accuracy of Story's citations, the Court said:
But surely they [the framers of the Bill of Rights] intended
more than to register a fear of the forms of abuse that went
out of practice with the Stuarts.

.

.

.

[I]t must have come

to them that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other
than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation." 7
Many state courts have accepted this reasoning. In the course of a
steady liberalization of the doctrine, the test of a punishment has at
least ostensibly come to be whether "it shocks the conscience and sense
of justice of the people of the United States" "' rather than whether
9
it would have shocked some previous generation of Europeans."
623.
"14 In the Matter of O'Shea, 11 Cal. App. 568, 576, 105 Pac. 776, 779 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1909).
115 That it can never be entirely moot was demonstrated by a state representative
in Massachusetts who, in 1937, offered a bill for the re-institution of the whipping
post, ducking stool and public stocks. Hentig, The Pillory: A Medieval Punishment,
11 Rocky MT. L. REv. 186 (1939).
116 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (4-to-2 decision).
"17 Id. at 372. The dissent, joined in by Mr. Justice Holmes, preferred the strict
approach.
1sUnited States v. Rosenberg 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 838 (1952), stay of execution granted by Mr. Justice Douglas vacated per
curiam after hearing on merits, 346 U.S. 273, 288 (1953).
119 It is not clear whether the conscience referred to is literally that of the
"people" or rather that of the presumably more "enlightened" judge. See Judge
Frank's discussion in United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F2d 583, 611 (2d Cir. 1952) ;
Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 846, 851 (1961). See generally Calm, Authority and Responsibility, 51 CoLuxm. L. RKv. 838 (1951).
11s 2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 108, at
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It has occurred to some that this liberalized interpretation of the
cruel and unusual punishment ban offers the only avenue of attack
against the practice of banishment, particularly as a condition to executive pardon. An early New York court upholding a condition of
banishment said: "The governor may grant a pardon on a condition
which does not subject the prisoner to an unusual or cruel punishment." 120 Although striking down a sentence of banishment in the
absence of legislative authority, a recent New York court stated in
dictum that such legislation would be valid "unless in the intervening
century and a half [since Cooper v. Telfair .2 held banishment to be
a right of the state] the public . . . [mores have] made such punishment cruel and unusual and therefore violative of . . . the Constitution

of the State of New York." ' One of the few comments that supports
banishment on its merits states: "Attack on the constitutionality of the
condition here imposed can be founded only on the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments." '
These passages, however, do not represent judicial holdings, and
most courts have summarily dismissed the idea that banishment might
be cruel and unusual. 2 4 Rarely have they analyzed their conclusion
beyond stating it. One court, although dealing with a different problem, indulged in a lengthy discussion of the physical punishments that
were traditionally cruel and unusual and concluded that banishment is
not like them.' 25 Another found that banishment "is sanctioned by
authority, and has been inflicted, in this form, from the foundation of
our government." 126 The only case that has attempted any really extensive investigation of the problem is Legarda v. Valdez, 2 T which
arose in the Philippine Islands shortly after the turn of the century.
This case is the single authoritative pillar upon which practically all
opinions dealing with the question rest. However, it did not involve
the type of banishment for which it is usually used as authority. The
banishment in Legarda was only for a term of years, appeared to have
some rehabilitative motivation behind it, and only forbade the offender
access to certain cities. It does not, therefore, fall within the definition
1 20

People v. Potter, 1 Parker, Cr. R. 47, 56-57, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235, 245 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct 1846).
1214
122

U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800).

People v. Wallace, 124 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (Suffolk County Ct 1953).

1=30 CoLUm. L. Rv. 1057 (1930); cf. Navasky, Deportation as Punishment,
27 U. KAN. CiTy L. RrV. 213, 218 (1959).
124 E.g., Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146 (1902) ; People v. Baum, 251 Mich.
187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930); People v. Potter, 1 Parker, Cr. RL 47, 1 Edrni Sel. Cas.
Sup. Ct. 1846).
235 (N.Y.
i 2 , See State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385 (1910) (dictum).
126 People v. Potter, 1 Parker, Cr. R. 47, 57, 1 Edn. Sel. Cas. 235, 245 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct 1846).
1271 Philippine 146 (1902).
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of objectionable banishment. In addition, Weems v. United States"
had not yet been decided. All citations in Legarda represented the
school of thought that required physical torture as the touchstone for
2
unconstitutional cruelty.1

9

C. The Terms of the ConstitutionalBan
1. Punishment
Does banishment constitute punishment? Clearly it does when
imposed by sentence. The difficulty arises when it is a condition of
pardon. In dealing with deportation, the Supreme Court has said that
"[deportation] is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this
country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty." ' The theory behind this
approach seems to be that something normally considered to be punishment should not lose that denotation by being subsumed in a purportedly non-penal act. "The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain inalienable rights .

.

.

.

Any

deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is
punishment, and can be in no otherwise defined." " The same reasoning can be applied to banishment by pardon. Justices Brewer and
Peckham, though not dealing with the eighth amendment, adopted the
statement of one commentator that "Banishment is always [a punishment] . . . , for a mark of infamy cannot be set on any one, but with a

view of punishing him for a fault, either real or pretended." 132 The
same characterization was used when a federal court struck down the
1 4
Exclusion Acts of 1882, 1884, and 1888 133 as bills of attainder.
This approach supports the proposition that the punitive nature of
banishment infects any device by which it is dispensed. In two recent
cases the Court made it clear that the closely analogous sanction of
expatriation could be considered only as punishment 3 5
There are instances-sterilization and deportation being the two
most prominent examples--of apparently punitive sanctions which do
not constitute punishment. Neither of these is analogous to banishment. Sterilization laws will not be upheld without a clear demonstra217 U.S. 349 (1910) ; see note 116 supra and accompanying text.
Accord, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
30 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
131 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321-22 (1866).
132 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 270 (1905) (dissenting opinion). See
Comment, 56 MicH. L. tEv. 1142, 1163 (1958).
133Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58; Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23
Stat 115; Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504.
'U4 In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 437 (C.C.D. Ore. 1888).
136 Kennedy v. Mindoza-Martinez, Rusk v. Cort, 31 U.S.L. W= 4159, 4165
(U.S. Feb. 18, 1963).
128

129
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tion of valid eugenic rather than penal purpose.13 6 Deportation of
aliens has been justified on the ground that the federal government's
control of aliens is administrative rather than penal.1 37 It would be
difficult to maintain that banishment of citizens by pardon is similarly
concerned with some valid non-punitive purpose. Only by defining
punishment solely in terms of retribution can pardon be said to be
entirely outside the penal framework.
2. Unusual
Is banishment unusual? Even Legarda v. Valdez indicated that
it is.as Under the strictest interpretation, an unusual punishment
would be one that was unknown at common law or obsolete at the
time of enactment of the relevant constitutional provision." 9 No
court, however, adheres to that restrictive view. Rather, "any punishment which if ever employed at all, has become altogether obsolete,
must certainly be looked upon as 'unusual."' 140 Moreover, most
courts do not insist upon complete obsolescence. The generally accepted meaning of the word unusual is the "ordinary one, signifying
something different from that which is generally done." 14
Few courts today would acknowledge a punishment to be cruel
and then refuse to strike it down because the cruelty was widespread.
Unusualness seems to have been absorbed into the concept of cruelty.
It survives only to flavor the total prohibition with a sense of the
bizarre. It may also serve as a useful makeweight where a court cannot or does not care to reconcile its own misgivings with the less
squeamish convictions of the public at large.142
By any definition, banishment must surely be considered unusual.
It is infrequently invoked, invalid as a sentence, and undoubtedly seems
archaic to the general public, most of whom probably do not even
know that it still exists.
3. Cruelty
The crucial question is whether banishment is cruel. The courts
are developing a two-pronged approach to the definition of cruelty
13 6 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) ; State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126
Pac. 75 (1912); cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
Contra,
l 37 Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 56 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1932).
138 See 1 Philippine 146, 148 (1902) ; 32 N.C.L. REv. 221, 224 (1954).
1391 COOLEY, CoNsmrTioxArL LIMITATIONS 694 (8th ed. 1927).
140 Ibid.
4
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958).
1 1Trop
142 The "unusual" requirement has been particularly useful in this respect in
cases involving capital punishment. E.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
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involving the concepts of disproportionate punishment and intrinsic
cruelty.
a. DisproportionatePunishment
The notion that "punishment should . . . be made to fit the
crime and not the offender" 143 might seem foreign to modem theories

of individualized justice.1 44 But justice dispensed by men can never
be perfectly individualized. At the boundaries of permissible severity
the sentence must bear some relation to the offense. It is now clear
that a punishment of disproportionate or inappropriate severity can be
unconstitutional. "[W]e believe that it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense." 14' In setting the outer limits of permissible punishment,
Weems v. United States looked directly to whether the valid purposes
of punishment were served by the particular sanction imposed. A
later Supreme Court opinion 14 has been interpreted to mean that
"due process is denied if punishment and offense have no rational relation." 147 In a recent decision, the Court held unconstitutional a
California statute making narcotics addiction a crime. Stating that
addiction is an illness, the Court said:
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But
the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for
the "crime" of having a common cold. 4 s
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, stated that even a fine
would be cruel and unusual if imposed for sickness. He further
declared:
The purpose of . .

.

[the statute] is not to cure, but to

penalize. Were the purpose to cure, there would be no need
for a mandatory jail term of not less than 90 days. .
Cason v. State, 160 Tenn. 267, 271, 23 S.W2d 665, 667 (1930).

.

.

I

143

144

See GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRnnNAL JUsTIcE 100 (1933); Brown, West

Virginia Indeterminate Sentence and Parole Laws, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 143 (1957) ;
Glueck, Indeterminate Sentences and Parole in the Federal System: Some Comments
on a Proposal, 21 B.U.L. Rav. 20, 21 (1941). Some of the most exquisitely cruel
tortures were clearly intended to fit punishment to crime; e.g., the penalty for adultery
in ancient Hindu law provided that the man be roasted on an iron bed and the woman

be devoured by dogs.
1 LAW MAGAZINE &

Fink, Crimes and Punishment Under Ancient Hindu Law,

RFav. (4th ser.) 321 (1875).

145 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
146 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
147Whalen, Punishment for Crime: The Supreme Court and the Constitution,

L. REv. 109, 122 (1951).
35 MIm.
148 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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think the means must stand constitutional scrutiny, as well as
the end to be achieved. .

.

.

This prosecution has no rela-

tionship to the curing of an illness. Indeed, it cannot, for
the prosecution is aimed at penalizing an illness, rather than
with providing medical care for it. 49
The focus, therefore, is on whether there is a valid relationship
between means and ends. Imprisoning a dope addict is unconstitutional because the solution is irrelevant to the problem. On this
reasoning, banishment should be held to be unconstitutional since it has
no relevance to the solution of any problem at all.
There is strong feeling, however, that as long as a punishment is
legislatively prescribed and is not intrinsically cruel, it is not to be
nullified for its lack of appropriateness in the light of the offense.
Courts reasoning this way have refused to overturn some rather disproportionate sentences.150 They have also refused to consider such
things as unequal treatment of the equally guilty,' 51 anomalous penalties
for similar crimes, 5 2 and cumulative penalties for technically independent violations. 53 "It has invariably been held that, no matter how
harsh and severe it might seem to this court, yet, if it was within the
limits prescribed by statute

.

.

.

this court could not

.

.

.

reverse the

judgment." '2 In deferring to the legislature, the courts often revive
the normally moribund "unusual" element of the constitutional prohibition. A usual punishment that also represents the will of the legislature can hardly be cruel.' 5 5 This idea has been so twisted that one
14

9

Id. at 676-78.

1W O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (fifty-four years for 307 separate
counts of shipping illegal liquor into a dry state); People v. Gaumer, 7 Ill. 2d 134,
130 N.E.2d 184 (1955) (fifty years for statutory rape); Lester v. State, 209 Miss.
171, 46 So. 2d 109 (1950) (twenty years for vehicular manslaughter due to drunkenness) ; Harding v. Commonwealth, 283 Mass. 369, 186 N.E. 556 (1933) .(five to eight
years for receiving stolen goods worth sixteen cents); Commonwealth v. Murphy,
165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896) (life imprisonment for carnal knowledge of consenting near-16-year-old girl by 16-year-old boy).
151 State v. Eckenfels, 316 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958) (co-defendants
received sentences of five years and life respectively).
152-Johnson v. State, 214 Ark. 902, 218 S.W.2d 687 (1949) (seven-year manslaughter sentence where minimum for second degree murder is five years) ; State v.
White, 44 Kan. 514, 25 Pac. 33 (1890) (court granted that penalty for statutory rape
compared to adultery and seduction penalties).
was incongruous
15 30'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
154Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607, 613, 49 N.E. 894, 896 (1898). This statement
was made in the face of a constitutional requirement that a sentence be proportionate
to the offense. Where no such requirement exists, courts have even less trouble in
avoiding the issue.
155 In People v. Gaumer, 7 Ill. 2d 134, 130 N.E.2d 184 (1955), the defendant
received fifty years in prison for statutory rape. The court admitted the sentence
was "apparently harsh and severe," id. at 138, 130 N.E.2d at 186, but affirmed it
because it was within statutory limits and because an earlier decision by the same
court had stated that "sentences of life imprisonment for statutory rape have been
upheld by this court." People v. Dixon, 400 Ill. 449, 452, 81 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1948).
It is parenthetically interesting to note that this statement is false. It rests on a
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court recognized, as a legitimate legislative purpose, the pandering to
a public tendency to lawlessness-the word usual was defined in terms
of the retributive expectations of the public at large. 5 '
Deference to public emotion is somehow easier for an appellate
court when an apparently disproportionate sentence is the result of a
jury's rather than a judge's decision.'
"It may be that the jury's
verdict was a harsh one, but they had the witnesses before them and
were in a better position to judge of the facts

...

,,168

b. IntrinsicCruelty
A penalty authorized by statute is open to constitutional attack
when it can be characterized as intrinsically cruel."' 9 The conception
of what constitutes unconstitutional intrinsic cruelty has moved a long
way from simple physical brutality. In an early case dealing with
cruelty to a slave, the Alabama Supreme Court said:
Cruel, as indicating the infliction of pain of either mind or
body, is a word of most extensive application.

.

.

.

If a

slave should be punished, even without bodily torture, in a
manner offensive to modesty, decency, and the recognized
proprieties of social life, the offender would be chargeable ....

160

Another early decision forbade, under a statute directed only at
cruel punishment, the "cruel, unusual, unnatural and ludicrous punishment" of ducking.'
Mr. Justice Field, while riding circuit in California, expressed his views about psychological cruelty in an opinion
mis-citation by the court in Dixon of three cases that could hardly be relevant to
statutory rape since they all involved violence of the most brutal variety: People v.
39, 119 N.E.
Mundro, 326 Ill. 324, 157 N.E. 167 (1927); People v. Poole, 284 Ill.
9, 99 N.E. 59 (1912).
916 (1918); People v. Rardin, 255 Ill.
166 Hart v. Comonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 109 S.E. 582 (1921). A sentence of
electrocution for attempted rape was affirmed. The court said:
It is well known that public indignation is as much aroused by the one offense
[attempt] as the other [rape]. .

.

. And the almost universal repugnance

which exists in the public mind. . . and the general aversion to the putting
of the prosecutrix through the indecent and harrowing ordeal of having to
testify in court upon such a subject, are well known. The likelihood of the
resort to lynch law, unless there is a prompt conviction and a severe penalty
imposed, and thus a resultant grave shock to the peace and dignity of the
commonwealth, is well known to exist . . . . These are considerations
which the legislature properly could . . . take into account

.

.

as an ele-

ment of the measure of the punishment.
Id. at 746-47, 109 S.E. at 588.
(ten years for
157 Pineda v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 609, 252 S.W.2d 177 (1952)
indecent exposure); Missouri v. Edmonson, 309 S.W.2d 616 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958)
(five years for a felon's driving a car without permission).
158 Reeves v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 208, 214, 167 S.W2d 176, 180 (1943).
159 State v. Devore, 225 Iowa 815, 281 N.W. 740 (1938).
160 Turnipseed v. State, 6 Ala. 664, 665 (1844). (Emphasis added.)
161 James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. & R. 220, 225 (Pa. 1825).
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awarding damages to a Chinese plaintiff whose queue had been cut off
pursuant to a discriminatory misdemeanor ordinance:
Probably the bastinado, or the knout, or the thumbscrew, or
the rack, would accomplish the same end; and no doubt the
Chinaman would prefer either of these modes of torture to
that which entails upon him disgrace among his countrymen
and carries with it the
constant dread of misfortune and
16 2
suffering after death.

In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court declared: "A
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth" "~and proceeded to articulate a major break
with the old notion of the character of cruelty. The punishment imposed was fifteen years at hard labor in chains, with burdensome lifetime control after release.' 64 Despite the fact that no physical torture
was involved, the punishment was found offensive not only because it
was disproportionate but also because of its intrinsic character.-'
In a more recent case, the Court rejected the claim of a convicted
murderer, who had been subjected to an unsuccessful electrocution
attempt, that his execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment."'O

But all of the justices recognized that cruelty can be extreme

although not in any way physical.
This developing standard has also been applied in deportation
cases. The courts have often expressed awareness of the extreme
cruelty of that practice. It is significant that banishment is often mentioned by way of analogy to the cruelty inflicted upon a deported alien
who has acquired roots in this country. The strong implication is that
deportation would be unconstitutional, if, like banishment, it could be
considered as punishment rather than as the mere administrative regulation of aliens who have no inherent right to remain in the country.
Speaking of the alien and sedition laws of 1798, James Madison said:
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he
has been invited as the asylum most auspicious to his happiness,-a country where he may have formed the most
tender connections; where he may have invested his entire
property, and acquired property of the real and permanent, as
well as the movable and temporary kind; where he enjoys,
under the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal
Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. Cas. 252, 255 (No. 6546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
163217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).

162

164 The punishment was a legacy of Spanish rule called cadena temporal and
the statutory minimum was twelve years.
165 217 U.S. at 377.
166 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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security, and personal liberty, than he can elsewhere hope
for; . . . if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment,

and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to
imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.'
Judge Augustus Hand declared that exile is a "dreadful punishment,
abandoned by the common consent of all civilized peoples." It is
"cruel and barbarous," and a "national reproach." " In a fairly
recent decision, the Supreme Court said that "deportation is a drastic
measure and at times the equivalent of banishment ....

" 169

Thus

the dissatisfaction with the deportation laws is commonly expressed in
terms of a comparison to something assumed to be unconstitutional0
banishment of a citizen."
The same considerations apply to banishment from a state or
city as to expulsion from the country. An important psychological
factor that is actually most applicable in the context of local banishment is the perpetual pall of criminality under which the individual
1
must live out his lifeJ.
This stigmatization is all the more insidious
because of the seductive appeal it holds for the convict who welcomes it.
The allure of an immediate "good deal," particularly to the type of
person likely to be faced with the situation, obscures long range consideration. The convict sells his future as readily as he might sell his
soul were he approached by the appropriate authority. The full significance of his decision is felt only when choice is no longer available,
and when the originally undesirable alternative would long have been
forgotten. 72
Something more than dictum can be appealed to in support of
this notion of intrinsic unconstitutional cruelty. In a recent case,7 3
four members of the Supreme Court held expatriation of a soldier for
desertion in wartime to be cruel and unusual. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren defined unconstitutional cruelty in broad terms comprised en167 Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800),
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 555 (2d ed. 1901).

in 4

ELLIOS DEBATES

108 United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 631 (2d Cir. 1926).

119 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
170

However, in Vitale v. Hunter, 206 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1953), the court

reimposed a fifteen-year sentence on a deported narcotics violator on the grounds

that he had breached his contract with the President by violating the terms of his

commutation. No direct reference was made to his status as an alien as having a
bearing on the reimposition of the sentence. The implication is that this court would
have come to the same decision in the case of a citizen.
171 The lifetime "accessory" controls imposed on the convict in Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), were a chief element in the unconstitutional cruelty of
the punishment there involved.
172 Cf. BENET, THE DEvIL AND DANIEL WEBSTE (1939).
173 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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tirely of non-physical factors. 1"4 The eighth amendment, said the
Chief Justice, is concerned with "nothing less than the dignity of man"
and therefore a state must punish "within the limits of civilized standards." Expatriation was considered cruel because it "subjects the individual to a fate of ever increasing fear and distress," and destroys his
"status in organized society." 175
Mr. Justice Brennan concurred on broader grounds that made it
unnecessary for him to reach the eighth amendment point.7 8 His
feelings on that matter, however, are reasonably clear. He recognized
the "uncertainty and the consequent psychological hurt" inherent in
expatriation. He found it to be insidious and "an especially demoralizing sanction." 177 He examined rather carefully the question
of penological justification as a counterbalance to cruelty:
It is perfectly obvious that it [expatriation] constitutes the
very antithesis of rehabilitation, for instead of guiding the
offender back into the useful paths of society it excommunicates him and makes him, literally, an outcast. I can think of
no more certain way in which to make a man in whom perhaps, rest the seeds of serious antisocial behavior more likely
to pursue further a career of unlawful activity than to place
on him the stigma of the derelict, uncertain of many of his
basic rights.'
These arguments apply equally to banishment, most particularly
to the usual interstate banishment under which the convict remains
within the bounds of the national society under conditions that closely
parallel those of the expatriate. From this expanded concept of
cruelty, no additional step need be taken to reach banishment. In fact,
expatriation is less terrifying than banishment. It involves merely a
loss of status in a community, not expulsion from it. 7 " Mr. Chief
Justice Warren stated that one of the most fearsome attributes of the
1

74

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent asked: "Is constitutional dialectic so empty

of reason that it can be seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than
death?"

356 U.S. at 125.

The dangers of judging cruelty in terms of the death

penalty are pointed out in Comment, 56 MicHi. L. REV. 1142, 1162 (1958).
175 356 U.S. at 100-02,

176Justice Brennan said that expatriation in this case was not within congres-

sional power to enact. He voted with the majority in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44 (1958), which was decided the same day and held that expatriation of a nonpunitive nature for voting in a foreign election was within congressional authority.
'77 356 U.S. at 110-11.
178Id. at 111. See also an excellent Note on the Expatriation Act of 1954 which
is relied on directly by the majority, 356 U.S. at 101 n.33, and which says, "Economy
to the state is perhaps the only objective of punishment which expatriation is certain

to serve." Note, 64 YA.LE L.J. 1164, 1193 (1955).
179 "The danger of expulsion, and its consequences, is by far the most serious
1195.
consequence of expatriation." Id. at
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unconstitutional cruelty inflicted upon an expatriate is the fact that "he
may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized
people." 18
VI. CONCLUSION
It would seem that a practice "universally decried by civilized
people" should have no place in a modem, purportedly civilized, society.
Banishment has retained something of the place it once shared with the
thumbscrew, the rack, and other medieval refinements chiefly because
of the subtle nature of its barbarism and its practical usefulness in the
deflection of difficult political or social problems.
This sort of misuse can be ended once and for all by judicial
recognition of the fact that banishment fits well within the modem
conception of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
A finding to that effect would remove from practice and consideration
an archaic device whose only place in a modem world should be in
fiction and history books.
180 356 U.S. at 102.

